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IMPEACHMENT OF A WITNESS'S CHARACTER
IN NEW MEXICO
By statute, in New Mexico, the character of a witness may be impeached by
showing either (1) that he was once convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, 1
or (2) that he has a reputation of bad moral character, 2 or both. Also, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico has adopted the common law rule that a witness may be impeached by showing his prior specific misconduct not the subject
of a conviction. 3
Only in criminal actions, with the exception of one civil action, 4 have questions concerning these three methods of character-impeachment arisen. Yet
neither the character-impeachment statutes, nor the common law rule, limit
5
impeachment of a witness's character to criminal cases.
These methods of impeachment, as they are allowed today in New Mexico,
are outdated. In criminal actions, and even more so in civil actions, the usual
purpose of character-impeachment can be only to prejudice the witness in the
eyes of the judge or jury. Only when it may be reasonably inferred from the
impeachment that the witness is likely to lie on the witness stand should character-impeachment be allowed. Our statutes and case law, as they stand, do not
reasonably limit the extent to which a witness's character may be impeached,
but, antithetically, unreasonably extend such impeachment to prejudicial limits.
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-3 (1953), set out in text, p. 578 infra.

2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-4 (1953), partially set out in text, p. 591 infra.
3. Discussion of impeachment by showing prior misconduct begins p. 583 infra. For
articles on character-impeachment in other jurisdictions, see Oppenheim, The Admissibility of Character Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching Witnesses in Criminal
Prosecutions, 12 Tul. L. Rev. 628 (1938) (Louisiana); Kauffman, Impeachment and
Rehabilitationof Witnesses in Maryland, 7 Md. L. Rev. 118 (1943) ; Note, Impeachment
and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Minnesota, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 724 (1952) ; Bishop,
Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses by Character Evidence in Missouri, 20
Mo. L. Rev. 142, 273 (1955).
4. Mead v. O'Conner, 66 N.M. 170, 344 P.2d 478 (1959). The action was based on
assault. The court, 66 N.M. at 174, 344 P.2d at 480-81, said: "It is also certain that the
credibility of a witness may be impeached by general evidence of bad moral character.
• . . It is certain that bad moral character of a witness may be shown by eliciting from
the witness specifies acts of misconduct." (Emphasis the court's.)
5. The statutes, supra notes 1 and 2, contain no language limiting statutory impeachment to either civil or criminal actions. And a fair implication drawn from Mead v.
O'Conner, sutra note 4, at 170, 344 P.2d at 478, is that the statutory and the common law
modes of impeachment may be employed in civil actions. O'Conner is a civil case. The
court indicates that it would have allowed the tendered character-impeachment testimony
had the testimony been non-collateral and material. Id. at 174, 344 P.2d at 480-81 Cf. Vargas v. Clauser, 62 N.M. 405, 311 P.2d 381 (1957), a civil action, wherein plaintiff sought
to introduce into evidence the defendant's plea of guilty to a traffic offense. The purpose
for which this evidence was offered is not given in the opinion, but it is unlikely that it
was offered to impeach. The court said, 62 N.M. at 409:
[A] plea of guilty and conviction based thereon is admissible under certain cir-

cumstances where the same act is involved in both criminal and civil proceedings.
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I
PROOF OF SPECIFIC MISCONDUCT: PRIOR CONVICTIONS

In General
Any person convicted of an infamous crime was, at common law, incompetent
to testify as a witness. 6 Incompetency was made a part of his punishment; he
' 7
was forever without honor and unworthy of belief. This "primitive absolutism
has been abolished, however, almost universally. Yet proof of conviction of
crime to impeach credibility is allowed by the case law or statutes of nearly all
jurisdictions in this country, including New Mexico. 8 Jurisdictions differ,
however, on the types of crimes that may be proven. Some jurisdictions allow
only the common law "infamous crimes"; others allow "felonies," "felonies and
misdemeanors," or "any crime." 9
The reasoning that underlies this method of impeachment has been expressed:
' . . . when it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime,
the only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the
general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to
show. It is from that general disposition alone that the jury is asked to
infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has
lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is of bad character
and unworthy of credit"
This reasoning has been attacked as unsound for two reasons: (1) Proof of
6. "This strict rule of law included not only those crimes pertaining to dishonesty but to
all infamous crimes under the laws of England, generally enumerated as treason, felony,
and the crimen falsi." Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166,
174 (1940).
7. McCormick, Evidence §43, at 89 (1954). In New Mexico, under N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 20-1-8 (1953), no witness can be disqualified on account of a common law disqualification.
8. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 987, at 572-617 (3d ed. 1940), listing the law of each
jurisdiction. In New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-8 (1953), all disqualifications at
common law may be used for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a witness.
9. McCormick, Evidence §43, at 90 (1954). See Note, 42 B.U.L. Rev. 92 (1962),
which sets forth the law on prior convictions in the New England jurisdictions.
10. Ladd, supra note 6, at 175-76, quoted by Dean Ladd from an opinion of Justice
Holmes in the case of Gertz v. Fitchburg Ry. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). Or, perhaps,
the argument could be made as it was made to the jury in the case of People v. Terry, 21
Cal. Rep. 1859, 370 P.2d 985 (1962), at 1000:
The argument was made that since appellant had been previously convicted of
robbery and robbery is stealing: 'it also involves this concept of honesty, so
that a thief and liar are generally the same thing. You show me a thief and I
will show you a liar, because it involves this concept of honesty.'
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a felony or misdemeanor is not in itself a sufficient basis for the inference that
the witness has a bad character and thus will lie. In order to infer lack of
veracity from conviction of crime, the details and nature of the criminal act
would have to be shown." But in most jurisdictions, including New Mexico,
the details and circumstances of the crime may not be shown on cross-examination. 1 2 Without such circumstances and details it is unreasonable to "take for
granted that a man's conviction for a crime does have some bearing upon his
ability to tell, 'the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.' "1s (2)
Many crimes have no bearing upon the truthfulness of the offender. Consider
the following example: Two men argue; one calls the other a liar. The latter,
rather than have a stain upon his reputation for truth, offers to duel, risks his
life to save his reputation, and kills the name-caller.' 4 It is irrational to infer
from this killing that the accused, who has defended his reputation for truth,
will lie on the witness stand. Likewise, it is unreasonable to infer that each and
every convicted offender is likely to be untruthful in the courtroom.
Thus, those opposed to the theory argue that the proof of crimes should be
limited to proof of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement-perjury and
forgery, for example-since only such crimes bear directly upon a witness's
tendency to tell the truth.' 5
Moreover, if the accused be the witness,' 6 proof of any crime to impeach
11. Ladd, supra note 6, at 177-78.
12. See State v. Roybal, 33 N.M. 540, 273 Pac. 919 (1928) ;State v. Conwell, 36 N.M.
253, 13 P.2d 554 (1932). Extrinsic evidence is generally not permissible to show particular acts of misconduct to prove the bad character of a witness. 3 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 979, at 532-38 (3d ed. 1940). Proof of conviction of crime, however, is an exception
to this rule. The examiner is almost everywhere permitted to prove the fact of conviction by the record of conviction. In New Mexico, under § 20-2-3, if the witness refuses
to answer or denies the fact of conviction, the examiner may introduce the record in
evidence. The reasons for excluding extrinsic evidence, when particular acts are to be
shown, are absent when a conviction is to be proven. There is no risk of confusion of
issues, no danger of unfair surprise. A witness's convictions are normally few in number;
the witness usually knows of what crimes he has been convicted. The record is quick,
simple, and reliable proof, because it is held to be conclusive of the fact of conviction.
13. This quote is from an article by Spencer, "So You're Going to Be a Witness,"
67 Case & Comment 16, 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1962). The paragraph from which the quote is
taken reads as follows:
It may seem to you that such convictions have no relevancy to the issues of
the lawsuit, but the law takes it for granted that a man's conviction for a crime
does have some bearing upon his ability to tell, "the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth."
14. Ladd, supra note 6, at 178-79. The example was taken by Dean Ladd, in turn,
from Jeremy Bentham.
15. See McCormick, Evidence §43, at 91 (1954), who seems to favor the proposal
in the Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 21, which limits impeachment to proof of crimes
of dishonesty or false statement. This rule is set out in the text at note 29 infra. And see
Ladd, supra note 6, at 182.
16. A defendant was made competent to testify as a witness under N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-12-19 (1953). For impeachment purposes, he is treated the same as any other witness.
Territory v. De Gutman, 8 N.M. 92, 42 Pac. 68 (1895).
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seems undesirable. Even if the crimes provable are limited to those involving dishonesty or false statement, the chances seem to be only one out of three that the
evidence will not be highly prejudicial to the accused:
Three possible effects from the introduction of the previous conviction
of the accused who offers himself as a witness should be kept in mind
. . (1)
(
The previous conviction may be taken for its intended purpose only, i.e., to test his credibility. (2) It may be used to show the
propensity of the accused to commit the particular act charged. This
is particularly true when the prior conviction was the same as the present charge and its nature is stated. (3) Proof of the former conviction
may create a general prejudice against the accused causing the jurors
to regard him as a bad individual and to consider it generally desirable
that he be put away quite apart from whether the present proof of his
guilt is sufficient under the law.' 7
With odds such as these, defense counsel will seldom put the defendant on the
witness stand. But in so protecting him against exposure of a prior unrelated
crime, defendant is exposed to prejudice by (1) not taking the stand and thus
having the jury infer guilt from his silence, or (2) not taking the stand, and
thus forfeiting the opportunity to persuade the jury of the truth of his story.
In New Mexico

The arguments against impeachment by showing conviction have had no
effect upon the New Mexico legislature. Since 1880 we have had the following
statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-3 (1953) :
A witness may be questioned as to whether he has been convicted
of any felony or misdemeanor, and upon being so questioned, if he

either denies the fact or refuses to answer, the opposite party may
prove such conviction; and a certificate, the substance and effect only,
omitting the formal part, of the indictment and conviction for such
offense, purporting to be signed by the clerk of court or other officer
having the custody of the records of the court at which the offender
was convicted, or by the deputy of such clerk or officer under seal of
said court, shall, upon proof of the identity of the witness, as such
convict, be sufficient evidence of his conviction. [Emphasis added.]
On its face, this statute imposes no limits on the type of crime that may be
shown: "any felony or misdemeanor." The evils inherent in this mode of im17. Ladd, supra,note 9, at 187.
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peachment are thus potentially present to their fullest extent in New Mexico.
The statute, however, like others, is subject to judicial construction. And the
manner in which the statute is construed can significantly affect the extent to
which those potential evils are realized in practice. We turn, then, from the
statute to the cases.
There are no New Mexico cases, at present, ruling on the question concerning the inquiry into whether the witness has committed a misdemeanor. And
there is only one case, State v. Knowles,"s that has raised the issue. In the
Knowles case, counsel for defendant sought to impeach a state's witness. He
asked the witness whether he used electricity without paying for it and was not
under a suspended jail sentence therefor. The witness denied the fact. Counsel
was not permitted to introduce the docket of the city police court to show the
conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding:
'[T]he offense charged was that of violating a city ordinance. This
is a civil matter. Under the law, it is not even a misdemeanor. But as
stated, the trial was by a tribunal which had no authority in law to try
anybody, and that was not a court, and the judgment is a nullity, and
it is excluded from the testimony. ' 19
There is no reason to believe, however, that the Supreme Court would disallow impeachment by proof of any misdemeanor. Some felonies no more indicate untruth than does a traffic ticket; some do not even involve moral turpitude. Yet those felonies may be shown. 20 Hence, it is reasonable to assume that
21
the court will impose no limits on the type of misdemeanor that can be shown .
In State v. Roybal, 22 the leading case construing Section 20-2-3, the scope
of inquiry into a witness's conviction was carefully limited. The Roybal Court
said that only the fact of conviction, i.e., a plea or verdict of guilty and judgment or sentence passed thereon, and the name of the particular felony or misdemeanor may be shown. The court then stated that evidence relative to an
indictment, or a plea of guilty is immaterial under the statute, "the conviction
18. 32 N.M. 189, 252 Pac. 987 (1927).

19. Id. at 191, 252 Pac. at 987.
20. See e.g., State v. Ocanas, 61 N.M. 484, 303 P.2d 390 (1956) (user of narcotics)
State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960) (drunk and disorderly) ; State v.

Griego, 61 N.M. 42, 294 P.2d 282 (1956) (manslaughter).
21. Massachusetts and Rhode Island both expressly permit, by statute, impeachment

by showing a misdemeanor. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 21 (1956) ; R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 9-17-15 (1956). Neither jurisdiction limits proof of misdemeanors involving moral
turpitude." See Note, 42 B.U.L. Rev. 91, 95-96 (1962).

22. 33 N.M. 540, 273 Pac. 919 (1928).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 2

of crime being the material matter." 23 Also, neither the grade of the crime nor
24
the term of punishment, the court said, could be proved.
The Roybal discussion concerning the inquiry permissible under the statute
laid a foundation for limitations that have been imposed by subsequent cases.
For example, it was held in State v. McCabe25 that the mere equivalent of a
conviction, as where the witness "paid the costs of suit," could not be shown.
And in State v. Lobb,26 the court held that the witness could not be asked
whether he had "been in custody of police officers," and by dictum announced:
'lit is] generally not permissible for a party to bring out the fact that
a witness has been accused of, or arrested or indicted, or that a warrant
has been issued for his arrest, or information filed against him, or
27
tried for, a crime of which he is not shown to have been convicted.'
Furthermore, the details of a crime may not be inquired into or shown by the
23. Defense counsel sought to impeach the credibility of the complaining witness, id.
at 546, 273 Pac. at 921:
'Q. You were convicted in this court with assault with deadly weapons.
A. Yes, I was indicted.
'Q. You plead [sic] guilty and was [sic] fined $50.00, is that not a fact?
A. No sir, I did not plead guilty, I arranged or fixed it up with him.' [Emphasis
added.]
Objection to the question of conviction was sustained and the evidence was stricken.
Counsel was permitted to introduce the record of conviction, however, later in the trial.
On appeal, counsel contended that his questioning was proper to lay a foundation for

proof of conviction; that he was denied the opportunity to show a contradiction in the
witness's testimony because the evidence was stricken. The Supreme Court held that
because counsel was permitted to introduce the record in evidence, he was not prejudiced
by the striking of the testimony.
24. The following inquiry was made to the complaining witness in the Roybal case,
and was stricken, id. at 549, 273 Pac. at 923:
'Q. In that cattle stealing case that you admitted you were convicted in you
were sentenced to serve a term in the penitentiary and were fined $500.00?'
The court said, id. at 549, 273 Pac. at 923, ihat under Section 2179 of N.M. Code 1915
(now N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-3 (1953)), there was attached ". . . [no] greater degree
of opprobrium to the conviction of one offense than another." But see State v. Riley,
40 N.M. 132, 55 P.2d 143 (1936), where the court held it permissible to ask the accused
whether he had been convicted of a felony and had served a term in the penitentiary.
25. 41 N.M. 428, 70 P.2d 758 (1937).
26. 41 N.M. 298, 67 P.2d 1006 (1937).
27. Id. at 299, 67 P.2d at 1007.
Other cases following the Roybal case are as follows: State v. Conwell, 36 N.M. 253,
13 P.2d 554 (1932) (held error to allow prosecutor to go' into details of accused's sex
crime) ; State v. McCabe, 41 N.M. 428, 70 P.2d 758 (1937) (not error to strike witness's
testimony that he "paid the costs of suit" because it is not a "conviction") ; State v.
Griego, 61 N.M. 42, 294 P.2d 282 (1956) (not error to ask accused if his conviction of
a prior felony was manslaughter) ; State v. Ocanas, 61 N.M. 484, 303 P.2d 390 (1956)
(not error to ask accused as to prior crimes of (1) user of narcotics, (2) grand auto
theft) ; State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960) (not error to ask accused
as to prior convictions of assault and battery, drunk and disorderly).
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examiner on cross-examination. 28 Such inquiry, if the witness be the accused,
would be much too prejudicial.
Conclusion

Because Section 20-2-3 allows proof of crimes that have no rational bearing
upon a witness's truthfulness, it should be amended, or repealed. The New

Mexico law of impeachment by showing a prior conviction is but a step away
from the "primitive absolutism" of the common law. The criminal is still punished, and for irrational reasons.
The most desirable law on impeachment by showing a prior conviction is
that set forth in the Uniform Rules of Evidence:
Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not involving
dishonesty or false statement shall be inadmissable for the purpose of

impairing his credibility. If the witness be the accused in a criminal
proceeding, no evidence of his conviction of a crime shall be admissable
for the sole purpose of impairing his credibility unless he first introadmissable solely for the purpose of supporting his
duced evidence
29
credibility.
This rule "logically limits evidence of conviction for impeachment purposes to
crimes involving dishonesty and false statement. 30° In addition, it takes the
accused out of his predicament. He will be encouraged to take the witness stand
and give his story without danger of prejudicial determination of his guilt.
Yet the statute stands, and the Supreme Court in future cases should take
steps to alleviate the effect of an obviously bad law.
Can a pardon be shown to rebut impeaching evidence? In Territory v.
Chavez,3 x the court held that a pardon could not be shown by the witness in
order to mitigate the evidence of his conviction. The pardon, however, was not
based on an executive finding that the witness was innocent of his prior crimes.
The witness had turned state's evidence; he was favored by the granting of a
pardon. This sort of pardon, or one granted through political pressures, is not
a valid mitigating circumstance for rebutting impeaching evidence. It would be
wrong, however, to hold that a witness may not show that he was granted a
pardon because he was mistakenly found guilty of a crime. The Chavez case,
on its facts, does not so hold. The court, therefore, is free to reach a right result
where a pardon was granted because of a person's innocence.
Can circumstances of the crime, or of the conviction, be shown by the wit28. State v. Conwell, 36 N.M. 253, 13 P.2d 554 (1932).

29. Uniform Rule of Evidence 21.
30. Comment to Uniform Rule of Evidence 21.
31. 8 N.M. 528,45 Pac. 1107 (1896).
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32

ness? As a matter of policy, extrinsic evidence concerning the circumstances
of the conviction or crime are excluded from evidence because of the risk of
confusion of issues. Such evidence leads to collateral issues. Yet evidence that
may lead to collateral issues is ofttimes necessary and should be allowed. In
order to determine whether there is any correlation between crimes that do not
involve dishonesty or false statement and the truthfulness of a witness, the
circumstances and details of the crime would have to be shown.
The importance of evidence of the circumstances of the conviction or the
crime should be considered in each particular case. Assuming that a witness who
is not the accused should not be able to show circumstances of his crime or his
conviction, where the accused is the witness the situation is much different. For
if the witness be the accused, there is too great a danger that the jury will be
prejudiced on the merits by virtue of the crime shown to impeach. Rebutting
evidence is necessary to counteract the prejudice. Any risk of side issues is worth
chancing. Because of the importance of these issues, the time required to present
the evidence is justified.
In New Mexico, the law concerning the showing of circumstances by a witness is hollow. The New Mexico Statute, Section 20-2-3, is silent on the question. The statute sets forth only what the impeaching party may show."3 There
34
is but one case, Territory v. Garcia,
that considered the question. The Garcia
Court held that a witness who was not the accused could not explain the circumstances of the crime. 35 Thus, this case is distinguishable, and could be
placed on the ground that where the witness is not the accused, the evidence of
circumstances is collateral and not admissable. Yet the Territorial Court seemed
to recognize that the defendant may be entitled to more protection than the
prosecution. In Territory v. Chavez, 36 the defense was allowed to go beyond
the record of conviction to show circumstances and details of the crimes of witness-accomplices in order to show circumstances of atrocity and deliberation. 3 7
Prior crimes may not be shown to imply that the accused committed the
32. Circumstances of the conviction would be such mitigating factors as a suspended
sentence and probation, and possibly, within the discretion of the court, the fairness of
the hearing. Circumstances of the crime would be such factors as intent, motive, maturity,
etc. Of course, the extent to which a witness would be allowed to explain these circumstances should be controlled by the discretion of the court.
33. The prosecution can only show the "fact of conviction" as construed by the
Roybal and Lobb cases. See text at notes 16-21 supra.
34. 15 N.M. 538, 110 Pac. 838 (1910).
35. The Garcia case has not been subsequently cited for this holding, and it is improbable that witnesses (including defendants) in our courts today are not allowed to
explain circumstances surrounding their prior crime either on direct, cross, or redirect
examination. Cf. State v. Edmondson, 26 N.M. 14, 188 Pac. 1099 (1920) (held error to
disallow state's witness to explain facts that would otherwise discredit by showing bias).
36. 8 N.M. 528, 45 Pac. 1107 (1896).
37. The Chavez case, decided thirty-two years before State v. Roybal, held that
where the witnesses were accomplices of the defendant, the latitude of proof of prior
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offense for which he is on trial unless the crime is relevant to prove motive, intent, identity, etc.38 Yet where the crime is shown in order to impeach the accused-witness, the effect is frequently the same as if the crime were introduced as
circumstantial evidence of guilt. The court should recognize this, and, under
the fundamental concept that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, should make
an exception to the rule that the accused, when he takes the stand, is to be
treated the same as any other witness. The prejudice to the accused that arises
out of such impeachment could be avoided by the requirement that the prosecution come before the court, in the absence of the jury, and state the conviction
so that the judge can first determine whether it will be prejudicial.
Although it seems too late to suggest that the court require the showing of
something more than any felony or misdemeanor, the field is still open for the
court to interpret the statute in favor of the accused in a criminal trial. This
is the only way under our statute to inject logic and reason into the law governing impeachment of witnesses. It is the only way to prevent injection of prejudicial evidence of "bad character" that is wholly immaterial to the charge
being tried. It is the only way to secure a "fair trial" to which the accused is
entitled.
II
PROOF OF SPECIFIC MISCONDUCT: PRIOR MISCONDUCT NOT THE SUBJECT
OF A CONVICTION

In General

At common law, counsel was permitted to inquire into the personal history
of the witness, including particular acts of misconduct not the subject of a conviction.3 9 And, in the early stages of the law specific misconduct could be proved
by extrinsic evidence. Not until the late 1700's did the English courts forbid the
40
use of extrinsic evidence to prove such acts.
In this country most jurisdictions allow impeachment of witnesses by showing prior misconduct. Such impeachment is allowed, however, only through
crimes ". . . should [not be] confined so absolutely to the record of those crimes." Id at
534, 45 Pac. at 1109. Prior crimes and prior bad acts of the accomplices were inquired
into by counsel for the defense. It was shown that one witness had been indicted for a
crime. The misconduct occurred under circumstances of atrocity and deliberation. The
court said, generally, id. at 533, 45 Pac. at 1108:
The latitude in cross-examination is particularly necessary where spies, informers, and accomplices are used as witnesses, otherwise the life of the persons
on trial must often be wrongfully endangered.
Inquiring into the indictment of a witness was also allowed in Borrego v. Territory,
8 N.M. 446,46 Pac. 349 (1896).
38. State v. Bassett, 26 N.M. 476, 194 Pac. 867 (1921).
39. McCormick, Evidence § 42, at 87 (1954).
40. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 979, at 532-33 (3d ed. 1940).

584
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examination of the witness himself, not by the use of extrinsic evidence. This
restriction partially meets the objection that the dangers of confusion of issues
and unfair surprise are too great. The courts, however, are given wide dis4
cretionary control over the latitude of inquiry. '
Impeachment of a witness by showing specific acts of misconduct not the subject of a conviction is based on the same reasoning as impeachment by showing
prior convictions: If the witness has committed particular acts of wrongdoing,
it may be inferred that he has a bad character; since he has a bad character, he
is likely to lie on the witness stand. 42 Yet the arguments against this reasoning,
set out above under Part 1, 4 3 apply equally here. There is no rational connection between the commission of one isolated bad act and the character of a witness; nor is it always reasonable to infer that one with a bad character will lie
on the witness stand. In addition, many if not most specific acts of misconduct in
no way bear upon a person's truthfulness.
In New Mexico

It was early established in New Mexico by two decisions of the Territorial
Court that the witness could be examined concerning his prior acts of misconduct.44 Under the rules laid down by the Territorial Court, trial courts were
given a large discretionary control over the latitude of inquiry. The court said
that "matters called for on cross-examination which merely excite prejudice
against the witness or tend to humiliate him or wound his feelings" would not
41. McCormick, Evidence § 42, at 87 (1954); see 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 979, at
532-38 (3rd ed. 1940).
42. See Part I, note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
43. See Part I notes 11, 14 supra, and accompanying text.
44. Borrego v. Territory, 8 N.M. 446, 46 Pac. 349 (1896) and Territory v. Chavez,
8 N.M. 528, 45 Pac. 1107 (1896). The court in Borrego seemed to permit this mode of
impeachment under the authority of Section 20-2-4 of N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) allowing
impeachment by general evidence of bad moral character. The court said:
Section 2087 of the Compiled Laws [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-4 (1953)] authorizes
the impeachment of the credit of a witness by evidence of his bad moral character, and the present tendency is to regard all facts as relevant which will
enable the jurors to decide to what extent the testimony of the witness can be
relied upon. Accordingly a witness may be asked with a view to show his character for truthfulness as to specific facts, not too remote in time, which may
tend to disgrace him, and counsel will be bound by his answers. [8 N.M. at 482,
46 Pac. at 359].
The court was, however, following the common law tradition of allowing broad scope
of inquiry into the personal history of the witness. The Territory was allowed to inquire
into an indictment of a witness-accused on a murder charge.
In the Chavez case, the court held it error not to allow counsel to go beyond the
record of conviction to show that the witness-accomplice was engaged in a conspiracy
to commit a crime, and to show commission of a crime under circumstances of atrocity
and deliberation.
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be proper subjects of cross-examination. 4 Disgracing questions, however, would
be proper so long as they concerned matters "which are calculated in an important and material respect to influence the credit to be given to [the witness's]
testimony. ' ' 46 But extrinsic evidence to show a prior act of misconduct was
47
not allowed.
The general rule that a witness could be impeached by his prior misconduct,
as set forth in the Territorial cases, is still followed today. 48 However, though
the Territorial decisions have been neither overruled nor distinguished, the
breadth of inquiry permitted by those cases has been limited to some degree by
subsequent cases. The Territorial Court had permitted the cross-examiner to
ask the witness whether he had been indicted. 49 Subsequently, however, in State
v. Lobb,50 the court held that the witness could not be asked whether he had
been held in police custody, and, in dictum, said that inquiry concerning an
indictment would also be improper. Similarly, in State v. Roybal,51 a 1928

decision, the court held that the examiner could not go outside the fact of conviction to show that the witness committed a crime, even though an early Territorial case had permitted inquiry into the circumstances and details of the
witness's crime.6 2 A further limitation of inquiry under the Territorial cases
was set forth in the case of State v. Shults, 53 in which the court held the following question improper: "And you had been taking things from different people
45. Territory v. Chavez, supra at 532, 45 Pac. at 1108 (Emphasis added). See Territory v. Garcia, 15 N.M. 538, 110 Pac. 838 (1910).
46. Territory v. Chavez, supra at 532, 45 Pac. at 1108.
47. Borregol v. Territory, 8 N.M. 446, 482, 46 Pac. 349, 358 (1896) (. . . counsel will
be bound by [the witness's] answer.").
48. The rule was made explicit in the leading case of State v. Perkins, 21 N.M. 135,
153 Pac. 258 (1915), as follows:
The law in this jurisdiction was settled by the territorial Supreme Court...
There is a sharp conflict in the authorities upon this question, but, as the territorial Supreme Court has adopted the rule that proof of a witness' particular
overt acts of wrongdoing are ordinarily relevant as impeaching evidence, but
that such acts can never be shown by any evidence outside the examination of
the assailed witness, and that the extent of such examination rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court, we can see no good reason to depart from the
rule. . . . [Id. at 144, 153 Pac. at 261].
Extrinsic evidence is forbidden: State v. Ellison, 19 N.M. 428, 144 Pac. 10 (1914)
State v. Clevenger, 27 N.M. 466, 202 Pac. 687 (1921) ; Mead v. O'Conner, 66 N.M. 170,
344 P.2d 478 (1959) (civil suit; ". . . the answer of the witness is conclusive of the
matter under inquiry.").
49. See note 44 supra, the case of Borrego v. Territory, 8 N.M. 446, 46 Pac. 349
(1896).

50. 41 N.M. 298, 67 P.2d 1006 (1937).
51. 33 N.M. 540, 273 Pac. 919 (1928).
52. See note 44 supra, the case of Territory v. Chavez, 8 N.M. 528, 45 Pac. 1107
(1896).
53. 43 N.M. 71, 85 P.2d 591 (1938).
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here in Alamagordo ? '54 No time, place, or circumstances was stated which
would apprise the witness that the question was directed to any specific wrongful
act of the witness. The implication of these limitations is that counsel cannot
inquire generally into matters of impeachment. He is confined to a "particular
overt act of wrongdoing," just as he is confined to the fact of conviction itself
when seeking to impeach by prior convictions.
The specific acts of misconduct allowed in the discretion of our New Mexico
Supreme Court have included the following: prior illicit relations, 55 murder, 6
conspiracy, 57 taking mortaged property out of the state,"8 and writing a threatening letter. 50
Cases involving sex crimes present a unique problem. Here the pertinent inquiries are whether, to impeach credibility, prior unchaste or lewd acts of a
prosecutrix may be (1) inquired into on cross-examination or (2) shown by
extrinsic evidence. Wigmore says that in such cases the prosecutrix's prior
chastity may have a direct bearing upon her truthfulness and that "no judge
should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by
a qualified physician." 60 Wigmore thus advocates broad inquiry as well as the
use of extrinsic evidence to show immoral character and particular acts of misconduct of the prosecutrix. 6' A majority of jurisdictions, however, do not allow
extrinsic evidence to show prior promiscuous conduct by the prosecutrix, although they do allow such acts to be drawn from the witness on cross-examina62
tion.
54. Id. at 72, 85 P.2d 592. But see State v. Solis, 38 N.M. 538, 540, 37 P.2d 539, 540
(1934), decided four years before Shults, and allowing the question: "And as soon as
you came here you became a law violator didn't you? . . . You became a law violator
from the moment you got to Bernalillo ?" The Shults case has not been cited for its holding
by any later cases.
55. See Territory v. De Gutman, 8 N.M. 92, 42 Pac. 68 (1895) ; State v. Martinez,
57 N.M. 158, 255 P.2d 987 (1953) ; See also Territory v. Garcia, 15 N.M. 538, 110 Pac.
838 (1910) where inquiry into prior illicit relations was allowed for the purpose of
showing interest of the witness.
56. See Territory v. Chavez, 8 N.M. 528, 45 Pac. 1107 (1896).
57. Ibid.
58. See State v. Schultz, 34 N.M. 214, 279 Pac. 561 (1929).
59. See State v. Holden, 45 N.M. 147, 113 P.2d 171 (1941).
In two cases it is impossible to tell from the opinions what was the impeaching question on cross-examination: See State v. Bailey, 27 N.M. 145, 198 Pac. 529 (1921) ; State
v. Parks, 25 N.M. 395, 183 Pac. 433 (1919).
60. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 924a, at 460 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore emphasized his
words.
61. 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 924a, 924b, 979, 980, at 459-68, 537, 543 (3d ed. 1940).
62. This is in keeping with the rule that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to show
particular misconduct not the subject of a conviction. For jurisdictions allowing crossexamination as to a witness's sexual morality for the purpose of affecting credibility,
see Annot., 65 A.L.R. 410 (1930).
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In New Mexico, the prosecutrix in a forcible rape case may be cross-examined
on prior acts of lewd conduct.6 a Extrinsic evidence may be introduced to prove
that the prosecutrix had prior illicit relationships with the accused; extrinsic
evidence is not admissible, however, to prove her prior acts of lewdness with
others. Prior illicit conduct with the accused is relevant as bearing upon the
issue of the prosecutrix's consent to the act charged. Illicit conduct with others
64
has no bearing upon the issue of consent.
. In statutory rape cases, where consent is never at issue, prior lewd conduct
as circumstantial evidence of consent is irrelevant. 65 Yet, although we have no
case deciding the issue, there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court
would altogether disallow such evidence for impeachment purposes. In State v.
Armijo,66 the prosecuting witness said on direct examination that the accused
penetrated her "just a little." Defense counsel asked her, on cross-examination,
if she had intercourse prior to the alleged rape in order to lay a predicate for
further inquiry as to whether penetration had in fact occurred. Objection to this
question was sustained. Counsel alleged on appeal that the question was proper
on the issue of penetration to attack the credibility of the witness. The Supreme
Court upheld the trial court, and said:
Here the sole reason advanced by defendant's counsel for admissibility of an answer to the inquiry whether the prosecuting witness
had intercourse . . . was on the issue of penetration. . . . The
prosecutrix had already testified . . . to the fact of penetration and
it must have seemed to the court without reason to permit a breach
of the doctrine against proof of prior unchaste acts, if any such there
were, upon the pretense of testing credibility on an issue about which
there was no genuine controversy.6 7
The court apparently thought that there was no issue of penetration present
at trial. And the defense counsel's offer of proof of unchastity was not for the
purpose of impeaching character, but for the purpose of discovering whether the
witness knew what "intercourse" or "penetration" meant. Thus the court did.
63. State v. Cruz, 34 N.M. 507, 285 Pac. 500 (1930). The court held it error to refuse

to allow defense counsel to ask the prosecutrix whether she had given birth to an illegitimate child some time before the alleged rape.
64. State v. Ulmer, 37 N.M. 222, 20 P.2d 934 (1933). The court held that the chastity
of the prosecutrix was relevant on the issue of consent, and therefore the rule excluding
extrinsic evidence to be used for impeachment purposes was not applicable. The court,
however, limited the purpose for which the extrinsic evidence could be used, saying that
both a third-person witness and the accused could testify as to prior lewd conduct of the
prosecutrix with the accused, but that neither could testify as to her conduct with the
third-person witness.
65. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 924b, at 467 (3d ed. 1940).
66. 64 N.M. 431,329 P.2d 785 (1958).
67. Id. at 433, 329 P.2d, at 786.
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not consider the admissibility of evidence of prior instances of unchastity for the
purpose of impeaching the veracity of the witness. It would be a reasonable ex-.
tension of the rule of State v. Ulmer, s to allow evidence of prior unchastity of
the prosecuting witness in a statutory rape case for impeachment of veracity
where there were genuine issues of penetration, identity of the accused as
perpetrator of the rape, or whether the incident ever took place. Although consent is immaterial in statutory rape cases, penetration and identity may be material issues, and issues about which the prosecutrix may lie.69
Where there is no genuine controversy regarding the facts testified to by a
witness, however, impeachment of that witness will not be allowed. Thus in
Mondragon v. Mackey, 70 a bastardy proceeding, a witness testified that she
had seen plaintiff and defendant together on different occasions. The defendant
had previously admitted being with the plaintiff. Defense counsel sought to
impeach the witness by asking her if she were not then living with a man not
her husband. She declined to answer; the trial court refused to compel her to
do so. The Supreme Court held such refusal proper, because the defendant was
in no way prejudiced by her testimony. Assuming the sole testimony of the
witness was that she had seen the plaintiff and defendant together on occasions,
the rule of the court is sound. There is no basis for impeachment of a state's
witness where the testimony of the defendant and that of the witness are in
harmony.
A defendant in a criminal case can be impeached the same as any other witness under New Mexico law.71 Thus, the prosecution may inquire into specific
acts of misconduct of the accused but may not ask whether the defendant has
merely been arrested or indicted. 72 There is an exception to the rule excluding
evidence of arrest or indictment, however, where the accused testifies on direct
examination in a manner that bolsters his credibility. In State v. Moultrie,73
the accused testified as follows:
68. 37 N.M. 222, 20 P.2d 934 (1930) ; see note 64 supra. The court held that the
chastity of the prosecutrix was relevant upon the issue of consent, but limited the evidence
to acts of the prosecutrix only with the accused.
69. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 924a, at 459 (3d ed. 1940).
There is . . . at least one situation in which chastity may have a direct connection
with veracity, viz. when a 'woman or a young girl testifies as complainant against a man
charged with a sexual crime,-rape, rape under age, seduction, assault. (Emphasis
Wigmore's.)
70. 65 N.M. 175, 334P.2d 706 (1958).
71. Territory v. De Gutman, 8 N.M. 92, 42 Pac. 68 (1895): "A defendant offering
to testify is subject to cross-examination the same as any other witness." Id at 93 (Syllabus). Yet the accused apparently has the privilege of declining to answer an incriminating question. Id. at 98, 42 Pac. at 69-70.
72. See State v. Roybal, 33 N.M. 540, 273 Pac. 919 (1928) ; State v. Lobb, 41 N.M. 298,
67 P.2d 1006 (1937).
73. 58 N.M. 486, 272 P.2d 686 (1954).
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'Q. Have you ever been in trouble before? A. No, sir. Q. You74 have
never been in court before? A. No, sir, this is the first time.'
On cross-examination the prosecution attempted to show that the accused had
been in court previously on a larceny charge and questioned the accused as to
his complicity in the larceny of a vehicle. The trial court allowed the reference
to larceny to go to the jury and the Supreme Court affirmed saying:
Whether the witness had stolen a motor, signed a written statement to
that effect and had been brought into court charged therewith, was a
proper subject of inquiry for impeachment purposes, after appellant
had opened the door for the contradiction of such evidence. 75
Similarly, in State v. Brooks, 76 the accused's admission that he had recently been
engaged in a fight and had been arrested therefor was allowed in evidence because he had testified, on direct examination, that since his childhood he had not
"been engaged in any fight." The Supreme Court cited the Moultrie case for
the proposition that evidence of offenses other than that for which the defendant
is on trial is admissable where the defendant "throws open to attack his credibility as a witness."
Although the rule allowing contradiction of bolstering testimony by showing
an indictment of arrest is reasonable, 77 the Moultrie decision is questionable
in part, for it is questionable whether the accused's statement that he had not
been "in trouble" should have opened the door to inquiry concerning the accused's arrest for an offense for which no conviction is shown. 78 That a person
is arrested does not necessarily mean he has been "in trouble." The mere accusation of misconduct, e.g., the fact of arrest or indictment, "is quite consistent
with innocence, and .. .such evidence is merely the reception of somebody's
'79
hearsay assertion as to the witness's guilt."
The remoteness in time of the misconduct of the witness should be consi dered
74. Id. at 487, 272 P.2d at 687.
75. Id. at 488, 272 P.2d at 687.
76. 59 N.M. 130, 279 P.2d 1048 (1955).
77. As in State v. Moultrie, 58 N.M. 486, 272 P.2d 686 (1954), to contradict the testimony of the witness that he had not been "in court" before.
78. The court in the Moultrie case, 58 N.M. at 488, 272 P.2d at 687, said this:
Of his own accord appellant went beyond the mere denial of the crime of which
he was charged. He was not satisfied to limit the issue as to whether he had

theretofore been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor but made the sweeping
claim that he had never been in trouble of any kind previously. Clearly, he had

full opportunity to deny the charge then pending without throwing open the
subject of his good name, thereby giving leave to the state to introduce rebuttal
evidence not otherwise available to it. Obviously, he wanted to impress the jury

of his excellent character. By doing so, his credibility as a witness was thrown

open to attack.
79. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 980a, at 545 (3d ed. 1940).
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when impeaching inquiry is to be made as to specific misconduct. New Mexico
has only one case considering the time element. In State v. Holden s0 the misconduct took place six years prior to trial. The Supreme Court held that six
years was not too long a time to exclude evidence of the act. Whether the act
is too remote in time to evidence the character of the witness is largely within
the trial court's discretion. It is an important consideration, however, because
character and conduct change. The age of the past offender, and his social and
economic circumstances at the time of his misconduct may have prompted his
prior misconduct; often, a person's character and conduct change as he matures
and as his social and economic status improves.
Conclusion

The arguments against impeachment by showing particular acts of misconduct are best stated by Dean Ladd in his article, Techniques of Character Testimony :81

[I] f the details of the past life of all witnesses were to be generally
opened to investigation it would make the task of being a witness an
unpopular one. There is also the question of the relation of particular
acts to general tendencies. It may be reasonably contended that in
most cases the general quality of the individual as an abstract observation is a more accurate basis of predicting human conduct than his
occasional misdoings or good deeds. As regards the character of the
accused in criminal cases there is the additional policy consideration
against requiring the defendant to be prepared to defend all the events
of his life rather than the particular charge against him, of which he has
notice. Furthermore, if particular acts of misconduct were admitted
generally as being an indication of his character there is danger that
prejudice resulting from their proof might over balance the probative value of their character-testing qualities.
The mode of impeachment by showing prior instances of misconduct is a
remnant of the common law. It furnished little probative value then; it has
little probative value now. The Uniform Rules of Evidence recommend prohibiting proof of particular acts of misconduct to prove bad character. Rule 22
says:
As affecting the credibility of a witness . . . (d) evidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait
of his character, shall be inadmissable.
80. 45 N.M. 147, 113 P.2d 171 (1941).

81. Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 498,
508-09 (1939).
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If our present case law on impeachment by showing prior bad acts is not
abrogated in the future, it should at least be modified. The Territorial cases
should be expressly overruled, or distinguished. It should be made clear that
cross-examination may be directed only to the specific act of misconduct itself,
not to accusations of misconduct or details of the misconduct.
Counsel should be required to inform the court, in the absence of the jury,
of the subject and purpose of the impeachment. The rule in the case of State v.
Shults that a particular time, place, or circumstance must be shown to apprise
the witness of the act being inquired into, should be the guiding rule of crossexamination.8 2 These requirements are perhaps the only effective way of preventing counsel from asking questions lacking any factual basis and thus falsely
implying by the question itself that the witness has engaged in misconduct. The
prejudicial effect of cross-examination concerning prior misconduct may outweigh its probative value even when the misconduct has actually occurred. Such
cross-examination is clearly unjustified where the questions are based wholly
on the examiner's speculation.
III
PROOF OF CHARACTER TRAIT

In General

At early common law, the bad general character of a witness could be shown
for impeachment purposes. By the 1800's however, the English courts began
restricting evidence of character to the specific trait of veracity. This is the
modern rule in England, and is the rule in a majority of jurisdictions in this
83
country.
In New Mexico

New Mexico still lives in the pre-Victorian era. Section 20-2-4 of N.M.
Stat. Ann. (1953) provides:
The credit of a witness may be impeached by general evidence of
bad moral character not restricted to his reputation for truth and
veracitv ...
Generally, character is proved through a witness who testifies that another
witness's reputation for truth and veracity or some other character trait is bad.
82. See note 53 supra, and accompanying text.
83. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 923, at 450-51 (3d ed. 1940). McCormick, Evidence § 44,
at 94-95 (1954). See Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 Iowa
L. Rev. 498 (1939), for a general discussion of character testimony.
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Most jurisdictions limit all evidence to reputation evidence such-as, "Do you
know the general reputation at the present time of Jose Nadie in the community
in which he lives, for truth and veracity?1 s4 Few jurisdictions allow personal
opinion evidence. 8 5
The argument given for the use of evidence of bad moral character is that
such character necessarily implies a disposition for telling falsehoods, and since
moral character is more easily observable than character for truthfulness, it is
a more adequate method of impeachment. 8 6
The argument against the use of evidence of bad moral character seems to be
more convincing. Wigmore sets forth three arguments:
(I) that, as a matter of human nature, a bad general disposition does
not necessarily or commonly involve a lack of veracity, and that therefore the former is of little or no bearing probatively; (2) that the estimate of an ordinary witness as to another's bad general character is
apt to be formed loosely from uncertain data and to rest in large part
on the personal prejudice and on mere differences of opinion on points
of belief or conduct . . . and (3) that the incidental unpleasant fea-

tures of the witness-box are largely increased when the way is opened
87
to this broad and loose method of abusing . . . witnesses.

The dangers of prolonged proceedings, confusion of issues, and degeneracy of
88
the trial are additional reasons for prohibiting evidence of bad moral character.
Only reputation evidence of a witness's character for truth and veracity should
be allowed. The New Mexico statute, Section 20-2-4, goes beyond this salutory
rule and the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the statute means what
it says.

In State v. Perkins,89 several witnesses were produced by the defendants for
the purpose of proving the general reputation of a witness for bad moral character in her neighborhood. The trial court refused the evidence and told counsel
that only reputation for truth and veracity could be proven. The Supreme
Court reversed, saying:
84. McCormick, Evidence § 44, at 94 (1954).
85. See McCormick, Evidence §44 (1954). Wigmore, however, strongly advocates
this type of evidence where the witness is the prosecutrix in a sex case. See Wigmore,
Evidence §§ 924a, 924b, at 459-68 (3d ed. 1940).
86. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 922, at 447-50 (3d ed. 1940) : "[T]hat [bad general character] necessarily involves an impairment of the truth-telling capacity, that to show general moral degeneration is to show an inevitable degeneration in veracity, and that the
former is often more easily betrayed to observation than is the latter."
87. Id. at 449 (emphasis Wigmore's).
88. 3 Wigmore, Evidenc § 921, at 446 (3d ed. 1940).
89. 21 N.M. 135, 153 Pac. 258 (1915).

DECEMBER 1962]

IMPEACHMENT OF A WITNESS'S CHARACTER

In the absence of statute, this is the correct rule, but in this state
we have a statute [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-4 (1953) ] which expressly
permits the credit of a witness to be impeached by general evidence of
bad moral character.90
Evidence of reputation for truth and veracity is also admissible in New
Mexico. In the Perkins case, the issue was raised whether prior reputation was
relevant to show present character for truth and veracity. The trial court held
that the prior reputation of a witness could not be shown. The Supreme Court
held that it was error to refuse defense counsel the right to prove that a witness
had a "bad reputation for truth and veracity in the neighborhood . . . at the

time he left there, two years preceding trial." 91
State v. Perkins, and the case of State v. Gallegos,9 2 are the only two cases deciding issues of character impeachment arising under Section 20-2-4. In State v.
Gallegos, defense counsel sought to impeach the dying declaration of the victim
of the murder for which the defendant was on trial by evidence of the victim's
bad community reputation for morality. The trial court did not allow such
impeachment. The Supreme Court, however, held it error not to allow the defense to impeach the dying declaration.
In the case of State v. 4nderson,93 the question as to a witness's reputation
for chastity was excluded because the examiner did not meet the procedural requirements in his interrogation.9 4 Thus the court did not decide the issue of
admissibility of a specific immoral character trait.
Although it has not been decided, it is probable that opinion evidence as
distinguished from reputation evidence would not be allowed. And it seems
90. Id. at 145, 153 Pac. at 261. The questions asked by defense counsel but rejected by

the court were these:
'Do you know Mrs. Knapp's reputation, as to her moral character?'
'Do you know Mrs. Knapp's reputation for morality in the neighborhood in
which she resided?' [Questions taken from transcript of record.]
91. Ibid. The court cited Wharton on Criminal Evidence for the rule that prior
character is relevant to show present character. The Perkins case is the only case concerning impeachment by showing a witness's character for truth and veracity. Counsel
sought to show past character, but there is no doubt that present character would be
allowed if the issue arose.
92. 28 N.M. 403, 213 Pac. 1013 (1923).
93. 24 N.M. 360, 174 Pac. 215 (1918).

94. The Anderson court said:
The question asked in this case was whether the witness knew the reputation
of [the witness sought to be impeached] for virtue and chastity-not what that
reputation was. It was merely a preliminary question, calling for a yes or no
answer. We are unable to tell whether the court erred or not, because no offer
was made by appellant that the witness would answer yes to the question. . ..
[Id. at 367-68, 174 Pac. at 217].
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that the court allows impeachment by evidence of general bad moral character
as well as evidence of a specific character trait, e.g., non-truth and non-veracity,
chastity.
No case has arisen in New Mexico in which a defendant has been impeached
by general evidence of bad moral character. Yet it is the rule in New Mexico,
as stated in Territory v. De Gutman,"5 that the accused-witness is to be crossexamined the same as any other witness. Thus the court is likely to allow the
accused-witness to be impeached by general evidence of bad moral character,
notwithstanding the rule that, unless the accused "opens up" the issue, the
character of an accused cannot be attacked for the purpose of introducing circumstantial evidence of his guiltY6 But if such impeaching evidence were to
be allowed, its effect would be much the same as if it were introduced as the
basis for an inference of guilt.
Conclusion
The reasoning that a bad character implies untruthfulness underlies the construction of Sections 20-2-3 and 20-2-4 of our statutes as well as the use of impeachment by showing prior misconduct not the subject of a conviction.97 The
reasoning, however, is itself a false premise upon which to base the application
of the New Mexico statutory and case devised modes of impeachment.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence place "the same limitation on character
testimony for impeachment purposes as . . . for evidence of conviction of
crime, in that it must relate to honesty or veracity" :s
As affecting the credibility of a witness . . . (c) evidence of traits
of his character other than honesty or veracity or their opposites, shall
be inadmissible ....
99
This rule is followed, in substance, by a majority of jurisdictions in this country.
It would be desirable to replace Section 20-2-4 with the same rule.
New Mexico still lingers in the past; it has not broken away from the harsh
and illogical rules of evidence that were once the common law.
The modern tendency is to abandon the old notion (a mark of a
95. 8 N.M. 92,42 Pac. 68 (1895).
96. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), which rules that the state
cannot attack the character of the accused, as evidence of his guilt, unless the accused
first puts on evidence of good character.
97. See notes 10, 42, 86 supra and accompanying text.
98. Comment on Uniform Rule of Evidence 22.
99. Uniform Rule of Evidence 22.
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primitive stage of opinion) that a usually bad man will usually lie
and a usually good man will usually tell the truth.
Hence, to the psychologist, the common law's reliance on character
as an index of falsehood is crude and childish.'0
JONATHAN

100. 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 921, 922, at 446-47 (3d ed. 1940).
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